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Ms. Marilyn M. Branch
Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Dear Ms. Branch:

Re: State

v.

Williams

Case No. 950332-CA
Pursuant to Rule 24 (i) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Defendant/Appellant Patrick C. Williams cites the
following supplemental authority in support of his argument that
a begrudging recommendation by the State also constitutes a
violation of the plea bargain agreement:
United States
v. Canada, 960 F.2d 263 (1st Cir. 1992)
(vacating sentence because "it is improper for the
prosecutor to inject material reservations about the
agreement to which the government has committed
itself"); see also id. at 271 (quoting Correale
v.
United States,
479 F.2d 944, 949 (1st Cir. 1973) ("a
prosecutorial failure to fulfill a promise or to make a
proper promise is not rendered harmless because of
judicial refusal to follow the recommendation or
judicial awareness of the impropriety"); United
States
v. Taylor,
77 F.3d 368, 371 (11th Cir. 1996) ("the
government's begrudging recommendation was too little,
too late to undo the effect of its breach").
Respectfully,

Ronald S. Fujino
Attorney for Mr. Williams
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Utah Court of Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake
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Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor,
P. 0. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this
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of May, 1996.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
PATRICK COCO WILLIAMS

Case No. 950332-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) , whereby a defendant in a
district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of
Appeals from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other
than a first degree or capital felony.

See also

Utah R. Crim.

P. 26(2) (a) .
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief
or in Addendum A:
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code
Code
Code
Code

Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.

§
§
§
§

76-5-103
76-5-108
76-8-508
77-16a-202

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
When the prosecution and the defense both agree to a plea
bargain arrangement, if the prosecution later unilaterally
breaches its promises, does the court err in not fulfilling the

initial promises?

(R 295-96) (preservation of issue) 1 .

See

"A

trial court's legal conclusions are accorded no particular
deference."

Grayson

(Utah 1989); State v.

Roper

Ltd.

Petersen,

v. Finlinson,

782 P.2d 467, 470

810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991)

("trial courts do not have discretion to misapply the law").
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for aggravated
assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-103; tampering with a witness, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508; and violation of a
protective order, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-108, in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt
Lake County, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding.
On February 10, 1995, Mr. Patrick Williams entered pleas of
guilty and mentally ill to the above charges in conformity with a
plea bargain agreement.

(R 255-68) . On April 21, 1995, the

court imposed the following sentences: a zero-to-five year term
for aggravated assault; a zero-to-five year term for tampering
1

In Santobello
v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 259 (1971),
defense counsel objected when the sentencing recommendation of
one prosecutor differed from the promise made by another
prosecutor who had negotiated the plea. Id. at 259. Such an
objection, together with a request "to adjourn the sentence
hearing in order to have time to prepare proof of the first
prosecutor's promise [,]" id.,
apparently preserved the issue for
appeal. A similar type of objection and request was made here.
See (R 295-96). In the alternative, the Santobello
case and the
virtually identical circumstances existing here reflect "plain
error" (error which is both obvious and harmful) or "exceptional
circumstances" (safety device invoked to make certain that
manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider
an issue on appeal). State
v. Archambeau,
820 P.2d 920, 922-23
(Utah App. 1991).
2

with a witness; and a one year term for violation of a protective
order.

(R 293). The terms for aggravated assault and tampering

with a witness were imposed consecutively and the term for
violation of a protective order ran concurrently with the other
terms.

(R 293-94).

continuance, see infra

On April 28, 1995, following a brief
Statement of the Facts, the court

reconsidered the sentence but left intact its original order.
(R 298-308).

This appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On February 10, 1995, the State and Mr. Williams mutually
agreed to a plea bargain.
B).

See

(R 218-25) (attached as Addendum

In exchange for Mr. Williams pleas of guilty and mentally

ill to aggravated assault, tampering with a witness, and
violation of a protective order, the State dismissed one count of
aggravated burglary together with the following recommendations:
The State recommends: (1) that the defendant be
evaluated at the Utah State Hospital pursuant to his
guilty and mentally ill plea; and (2) that the defendant
be committed to the Department of Human Services for
care and treatment, if deemed appropriate pursuant to
the evaluation at the Utah State Hospital, and that the
court retain jurisdiction, pursuant to § 77-16a202(1)(b), Utah Code Ann., and (3) that at the
expiration of the care and treatment provided by the
Department of Human Services, or if such care and
treatment is deemed unnecessary after the evaluation at
the Utah State Hospital, the court should recall
jurisdiction over the defendant's sentence pursuant to §
77-16a-202(1)(b) and place the defendant on probation;
and (4) that the defendant shall not be sentenced to
prison, but the State will recommend that he serve one
year of jail, without credit for time served, as a
condition of probation.
(R 218).
3

The trial court indicated that it would likely follow the
recommendations.

(R 222); (R 259) (court also wanted to review

the pre-sentence report).

The entry of plea proceedings, dated

February 10, 1995, were made in line with the agreed upon
recommendations.
At the time of sentencing, however, a prosecutor different
from the one who had negotiated the plea bargain appeared on
behalf of the State.
April 21, 1995) .

(R 282) (sentencing proceedings, dated

The new prosecutor acknowledged the prior

prosecutor's representations, (R 284), but rather than keeping
those promises the State chose to submit the matter in accordance
with the less palatable recommendation in the presentence report.
(R 285). The presentence evaluation recommended a sentence of
prison because "the Utah State Prison has the capacity to handle
individuals with this type of behavioral condition[.]"

(R 285).

Besides reneging on its agreement to recommend treatment at
the department of human services, (R 218) (recommendation # 2 ) ,
the State' breach altered the likelihood of probation and medical
and psychological treatment in a facility better suited to
address the care of Mr. Williams.

Due to the sudden change in

the State's position, Mr. Williams requested and received a one
week continuance to speak with the prosecutor who had originally
agreed to made the recommendations.

(R 295-96).

On April 28, 1995, the original prosecutor appeared and
stated that the plea bargain recommendations were changed because
of evaluations from the state hospital.
4

(R 301). Due to

conflicting claims of malingering, the State recommended that the
court retain jurisdiction by sending Mr. Williams to the state
hospital for more extensive observation.

(R 3 02).

The court

declined to alter its prior sentence.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
When a defendant fulfills his part of a bargain by agreeing
to enter a plea pursuant to promises made by the prosecution, the
prosecution must similarly fulfill any agreements that it makes.
Mr. Williams kept his part of the bargain by entering his guilty
and mentally ill pleas.

The State, however, breached its promise

of recommending probation and by submitting the matter at
sentencing with a recommendation of prison.

Despite the

existence of the State's prior promises and the trial court's
acknowledgment at the time together with its statement that it
likely would follow them, the plea bargain arrangements were not
subsequently followed.

The promises which prompted Mr. Williams

to enter his pleas should be enforced.
ARGUMENT
THE PROMISE BREACHED BY THE PROSECUTION SHOULD BE
FULFILLED SINCE MR. WILLIAMS HONORED HIS PART OF THE
BARGAIN
In Santobello

v.

New York,

404 U.S. 257 (1971), "we granted

certiorari in this case to determine whether the State's failure
to keep a commitment concerning the sentence recommendation on a
guilty plea required a new trial."

Id.

at 257-58.

The Court

unanimously held that when a guilty plea rests in significant
5

part on a promise by the prosecution, the promise must be
fulfilled.

Id.

at 263; accord

North

v.

State,

878 S.W.2d 66 (Mo.

App. 1994).
In Santobello,

as in the case at bar, the prosecution had

entered into a plea bargain and made certain promises in exchange
for the defendant's guilty plea(s).

Compare

404 U.S. at 258 (two

felony counts dropped, guilty plea entered for a lesser included
offense), with

(R 257-61) (first degree felony count dropped,

guilty and mentally ill pleas entered for a two third degree
felonies and a misdemeanor charge).
Because the prosecution in Santobello

had "agreed to make no

recommendation as to the sentence[,]" 404 U.S. at 258,
11

[p] etitioner represented to the sentencing judge that the plea

was voluntary and that the facts of the case, as described by the
Assistant District Attorney, were true.

The court accepted the

Id.

plea and set a date for sentencing."

At sentencing, though, "another prosecutor had replaced the
prosecutor who had negotiated the plea.

The new prosecutor

recommended the maximum one-year sentence.

In making this

recommendation, he cited petitioner's criminal record and alleged
links with organized crime."

Santobello,

404 U.S. at 259.

In response, the trial court stated, "I am not at all
influenced by what the District Attorney says, . . .

It doesn't

make a particle of difference what the District Attorney says he
Id.

will do, or what he doesn't do."
the maximum sentence of one year."
6

"The judge then imposed
Id.

at 260.

On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed.
"Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an
essential part of the process but a highly desirable part for
many reasons."

404 U.S. at 261.

"However, all of these

considerations presuppose fairness in securing agreement between
an accused and a prosecutor."

Id.

This phase of the process of criminal justice [entry
of pleas], and the adjudicative element inherent in
accepting a plea of guilty, must be attended by
safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably
due in the circumstances. Those circumstances will
vary, but a constant factor is that when a plea rests in
any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the
inducement or consideration, such promise must be
fulfilled.
Santobello,

404 U.S. at 262 (emphasis added).

The case at bar similarly requires fulfillment of the
prosecution's promises.

Mr. Williams, like Mr. Santobello,

"'bargained' and negotiated for a particular plea in order to
secure dismissal of more serious charges, . . . "

Santobello,

404

U.S. at 262; (R 218-25).
The additional condition for Mr. Santobello's plea was "that
Id.

no sentence recommendation would be made by the prosecutor."
But

see

404 U.S. at 259 (the State later recommended a one-year

term).

An additional condition for Mr. Williams' plea was that

"[Mr. Williams] shall not be sentenced to prison, but the State
will recommend that he serve one year in jail without credit for
time served as a condition of probation."

(R 259). But

see

(R

285) (the State later recommended treatment "either in prison or
7

at the state hospital").
breached its promises.

The prosecution in both instances
404 U.S. at 259; (R 285).

In addition, the trial court in each situation was not
necessarily "influenced by what the District Attorney says":
Nevertheless, we conclude that the interests of justice
and appropriate recognition of the duties of the
prosecution in relation to promises made in the
negotiation of pleas of guilty will be best served by
remanding the case to the state courts for further
consideration. The ultimate relief to which petitioner
is entitled we leave to the discretion of the state
court, which is in a better position to decide whether
the circumstances of this case require only that there
be specific performance of the agreement on the plea, in
which case petitioner should be resentenced by a
different judge, or whether, in the view of the state
court, the circumstances require granting the relief
sought by petitioner, i.e., the opportunity to withdraw
his plea of guilty.
Santobello,

404 U.S. at 262-63.

Mr. Williams is entitled to "specific performance of the
agreement on the plea", id.

at 263, with "considerable, if not

controlling, weight [accorded Williams' preference] inasmuch as
the fundamental rights flouted by a prosecutor's breach of a plea
bargain are those of the defendant, not of the State."
at 267 (Douglas, J., concurring).

As in Santobello,

See

id.

the judgment

here should be vacated.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Williams respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the lower court's order and enforce the promises in his plea
bargain agreement.

8

SUBMITTED this

day of October, 1995.

5
RONALD S. "FUJTNO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

LISA J. REMAL
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that I have caused
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court
of Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102, and two copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this

day of October,

1995

SDNALD
RONAl

DELIVERED by
this

day of October, 1995.
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ADDENDUM A

76-5-103. Aggravated assault.
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in
Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) Aggravated assault is a third degree felony.

76-5-108. Protective orders restraining abuse of another
— Violation.
Any person who has been restrained from abusing or contacting another or
ordered to vacate a dwelling or remain away from the premises of the other's
residence, employment, or other place as ordered by the court under a
protective order or ex parte protective order issued under Title 30, Chapter 6,
or Title 78, Chapter 3a, who violates that order after having been properly
served with it, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

76-8-508. Tampering with witness — Retaliation against
witness or informant — Bribery — Communicating a threat.
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if, believing that an official
proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he attempts to
induce or otherwise cause a person to:
(a) testify or inform falsely;
(b) withhold any testimony, information, document, item;
(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide evidence; or
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he has
been summoned.
(2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he:
(a) commits any unlawful act in retaliation for anything done by
another as a witness or informant;
(b) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit in consideration of
his doing any of the acts specified under Subsection (1); or
(c) communicates to a person a threat that a reasonable person would
believe to be a threat to do bodily injury to the person, because of any act
performed or to be performed by the person in his capacity as a witness or
informant in an official proceeding or investigation.

77-16a-202. Commitment to department.
(1) In sentencing and committing a mentally ill offender to the department
under Subsection 77-16a-104(3)(a), the court shall:
(a) sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that he
be committed to the department for care and treatment until transferred
to UDC in accordance with Sections 77-16a-203 and 77-16a-204; or
(b) sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that he
be committed to the department for care and treatment for no more than
18 months, or until he has reached maximum benefit, whichever occurs
first. At the expiration of that time, the court may recall the sentence and
commitment, and resentence the offender. A commitment and retention of
jurisdiction under this subsection shall be specified in the sentencing
order. If that specification is not included in the sentencing order, the
offender shall be committed in accordance with Subsection (a).
(2) The court may not retain jurisdiction, under Subsection (l)(b), over the
sentence of a mentally ill offender who has been convicted of a capital offense.
In capital cases, the court shall make the findings required by this section after
the capital sentencing proceeding mandated by Section 76-3-207.
(3) When an offender is committed to the department under Subsection
(l)(b), the department shall provide the court with reports of the offender's
mental health status every six months. Those reports shall be prepared in
accordance with the requirements of Section 77-16a-203. Additionally, the
court may appoint an independent examiner to assess the mental health status
of the offender.
(4) The period of commitment may not exceed the maximum sentence
imposed by the court. Upon expiration of that sentence, the administrator of
the facility where the offender is located may initiate civil proceedings for
involuntary commitment in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 12 or Title
62A, Chapter 5.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD

FEB 1 0 1995

STATE OF UTAH

I T Lf.KE COUNTY
By.

THE STATE OF UTAH,

•?

/(.//r'M^

Deputy Clerk

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT

Plaintiff,

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL & ORDER

V.

C r i m i n a l No. 9*4 iqnOJffi

Defendant.

JUDGE WDY^^S

fhftjick^

COMES NOW,

(jXn

PS

^Jb^A^

the defendant

[X)\\\\q^^0

in this case and hereby acknowledges the following:
I have entered a plea of . tguiltyi

(no contest)

to the

°*d tr><h^itJ}<A dj

following crime (s) :

PUNISI

CRIME & STATUTORY
PROVISION

(Mtrr./u^ax.
DEGREE

and/oa?
Min. MdiiQdLury—

A. fyyyvwTiteJ fteaukr- <fib -s-io$ uifr

Q-5 y s , pK/ws flWfo

B.

Pit) 5
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"RvrspP^A.

- ^ i b - T -5oT

^$>7k - 5 -\o%

ock
0

vcph

^K.

& 6,000 -fWJe,

Qrw&r\ 0*+dy
^Luoo

Ho^p^MJ

0-<_

0-r\ ^ b c U i ^ r N •

of

pA^bo^vr^-

G7w^--

Q ^

!>Mv4^

MCrtjU

^U^S^UCIWN

(J) -fls"^- M^< d £ 6 W * - w -

^UON

*i^4jU

-H-e_

AW'-

be.

(M<^f^-^-'i

WV&WN^

fa

I have received a copy of the

(charge)

CrnformationL

against me, I have read it, and I understand the nature and elements
of the offense (s) for which I am pleading

fg^ltyT) . (no contest).

<*od r>rcsD^J^JX^\ iXJ

The elements of the crime (s) of which I am charged are as
follows:

hi* <^Arlr\ ~*M^

<T\ ^CL.

UJ^JM

6 - Wl-rw>»?l^Wv.pg/UnrA : Uf})Jxwo^

^

My c o n d u c t ,

criminally liable,

t8
frA-t

ftwlu(&_

SPAUA/^

Osr, o f f i c i a l

hadJ ^

uv>j^^

.

pOCel>Aisr>A K ^€TAL^

\t> CdHe^pj-

and t h e c o n d u c t of o t h e r p e r s o n s f o r which I am

t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s t h e e l e m e n t s of t h e

c h a r g e d a r e a s f o l l o w s : Qrr\ ennhcxi\~ feJ9. Z*> IMH

(ti~m\

crime(s)
MtruK UMUUKO Sh
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I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with
knowledge and understanding of the following facts:
1.

I know that I have the right to be represented by an

attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be
appointed by the court at no cost to me.

I recognize that a

condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as
determined by the court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so
appointed for me.
-2-

600219

^

2.

I

Xhave not)) (have)

waived my right to counsel.

Tfr

I have waived my right to counsel,—I have done so Juiuwinyly;—
infill i,jnnt"1y ™* imi mn ^IM iy r<» M.M r..n^wj ^ " g ^ ^

of guiltyO/rtfl /YWh^JhdJ^ ^ *
4.

If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney

Js^jBflCYferflflJ IfelfrA^ ^kjdj^

and I have had an opportunity

to discuss this statement, my rights and the consequences of my
guilty plea with my attorney.
'

5.

I know that I have a right to a trial by jury.

6.

I know that if I wish\to have a trial I have the right

to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have them
cross-examined by my attorney.

I also know that I have the right to

compel my witness(es) by subpoena at state expense to testify in
court upon my behalf.
7.

I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf

but if I choose not to do so I cannot be compelled to testify or
give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will be drawn
against me if I do not testify.
8.
I need only
trial.

I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me
plead "not guilty" and the matter will be set for

At the trial the state of Utah will have the burden of
-3-

000220

proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If
the trial is before a jury the verdict must be unanimous.
9.

I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I

were tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would have
the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of
Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and that if I
could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would
be paid by the state,
10. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for
each offense to which I plead
-by pleading

(guilty)

(guilty)), (no contest) . -I know that

(no contest)

i-r> an nffpn^P fhnt rnrrim a

minimum mandaLuiy sentence thau i will be oubjocting myself to •
sei*ving d minimum mandatory oontonco for that offcncQ^. I know that
the sentences may be consecutive and may be for a prison term, fine,
or both.

I know that in addition to a fine an eighty-five percent

(85%) surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated 63-63a-4, will be
imposed.

I also know that I may be ordered by the court to make

restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes.
11. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive
periods, or the fine for additional amounts, if my plea is to more
than one charge.

I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or

awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been
convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present
action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.
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12. I know and understand that by pleading

{cjuilty)) $ W n^n-Mj}^ U

(no contest) I am waiving my statutory and constitutional rights set
out in the preceding paragraphs-

I also know that by entering such

plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the
conduct alleged and I am guilty of%the crime(s) for which my plea(s)
is/are entered.

'

13. My plea(s) is/are the result of a plea bargain between
myself and the prosecuting attorney.

The promises, duties and

provisions of this plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in the
Plea Agreement attached to this affidavit. W ~ p^t ^ c .
14. I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my
plea(s) of

^quiltyj) (no contest)

I must do so by filing a motion

within thirty (3 0) 'days after entry of my plea.
15. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by either
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the
Judge.

I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what

they believe the court may do are. also not binding on the court. ^ A j e / V ^ y ^
16. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind
have been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no promises, except
those contained herein and in the attached plea agreement, have been
made to me.
17. I have read this statement or I have had it read to me
by my attorney, and I understand its provisions.

I know that I
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am free to change or delete anything contained in this statement. I
do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are
correct.
18. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my
attorney.
19. I am
through the | 6

years of age; I have attended school
grade and I can read and understand the English

language* or an interpreter hab buuii provided to me.

I was not under

the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants which would
impair my judgment when the decision was made to enter the plea(s) .
I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication or
intoxicants which impair my judgment.
20. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind,
mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the
consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, defect or
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily entering my plea.

DATED this

10 ^

day of

febUMA^

, 19 ^fT .

^

D E F E N D A N T ^
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CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY
[Uiih^r^j

I certify that I am the attorney forfecKidL.C?G?

the defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement
or that I have read it to him/her and I have discussed it with
him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent.

To the best of

my knowledge and belief after an appropriate investigation, the
elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's
criminal conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the
other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the
foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.

SV EOT. DEFENDANT/BAR NUMBER

?

yW-&M^ 7
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING "ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in
the case against PajnKdk^ (0G0 UJtlXjux^rs^

, defendant.

I have

reviewed this statement of the defendant and find that the
declaration, including the elements of the offense of the charge(s)
and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which
constitutes the offense are true and correct.

No improper

inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been
offered defendant.

The plea negotiations are fully contained in the

statement and in the attached plea agreement or as supplemented on
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record before the court.

There is reasonable cause to believe that

the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the
offense (s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and acceptance of
the plea(s) would serve the public interest.

3SECUTING ATTORNEY/BAR JNUMBER
PROSECUTING

ORDER
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement
and the certification of the defendant and counsel, the court
witnesses the signatures and finds the defendant's plea of (guilty)
(no contest)

is freely and voluntarily made and it is so ordered

that the defendant' plea of

(guilty)

(no contest)

to the

charge(s) set forth in the statement be accepted and entered.

DONE IN COURT this

/ * day of

7Z*^C'

, 19*7^

ISTRICT JUDGE
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